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1. Introduction
  The distribution of illegal pirate copies of information goods might have a variety of
motives. Such copies are distributed on the one hand by the members of peer-to-peer
networks, who deliver digital goods on the Internet without monetary compensation
and who are motivated by e.g. a feeling of identification with the other network
members, and on the other hand by commercial pirates who are, more conventionally
from the perspective of the economist, motivated by the revenue that results from
their activities. Somewhat less obviously, the consumers of an information good
might also form clubs each of which buys a single copy of the information good,
produces further copies of it, and distributes one of them to all club members (cf.
Varian, 2000).
  There is a relatively large economic literature on end-user copying,1 i.e. of situations
in which pirate copies are produced without monetary compensation for the own use
of their producer. Dyuti S. Banerjee has recently put forward several closely related
models of commercial software piracy in (Banerjee, 2003, 2006a, 2006b), but it
nevertheless seems that until now economists have given much less attention to the
commercial piracy than to end-user copying.2
  Given that both commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy are illegal, there is
no obvious way of estimating to which extent the pirate copies of information goods
that are currently in use exemplify commercial piracy. Such estimates are nevertheless
available in the case of physical piracy in the music industry. E.g., according to a
report of International federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), approximately
37% of all the [music] CDs that were purchased in 2005 globally were pirate copies.3
However, in the case of the software industry, estimates of the extent to which pirate
copies get sold, rather than distributed for free, are more difficult to find.
  The Business Software Alliance (BSA) publishes yearly a piracy study which
contains estimates for the piracy rate (i.e. the ratio of the number of pirated software
1   For a survey, see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a).
2   See, however, Yao (2005), which discusses counterfeiting on a more general level, without
restricting attention to counterfeited information goods.
3  International federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), The Recording Industry 2006 Piracy
report, p. 4, available at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/piracy-report2006.pdf, accessed on
October 29, 2006.
2units to the total number of installed software units) for different countries of the
world, and also for different regions of the world as a whole. For example, according
to the BSA the worldwide piracy rate was 35% in 2005.4  However, such estimates do
not make a distinction between commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy.5
Nevertheless, e.g. the other surveys of the BSA suggest that both the commercial and
non-commercial forms of software piracy are of a considerable economic
significance.6
  The production costs of pirate copies are low – in the case of the pirate copies which
are distributed in an electric form via the Internet, they are almost zero – and the fact
that their prices are not driven to the level of their production costs via Bertrand
competition seems at first glance puzzling to the economist.  An obvious answer to
this puzzle is that it is costly for pirates to inform potential consumers of their
products, since this increases the risk of getting caught and receiving a punishment.
For example, if an illegally operating Internet site which offers pirate copies of
software products for sale informs its potential customers by sending e-mail messages
to randomly chosen addresses, each e-mail message increases the risk of getting
caught and receiving a punishment.  In this case the expected cost from a punishment
can be viewed as an advertising cost which is analogous with a variable cost of
production in so far that it is an increasing function of the number of the pirate copies
that are sold.
  Information goods can be protected not only by copyright and other intellectual
property rights but also by digital rights management (DRM) systems. Digital rights
management tools can, broadly speaking, be divided into cryptography (i.e. the
4 Third Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study,
http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/upload/2005%20Piracy%20Study%20-%20Official%20Version.pdf,
accessed on October 29, 2006, p. 13.
5  This is because the estimates of the BSA have been calculated from an estimate of the total number
of installed software units, which is based on the number of the sold hardware units and surveys
concerning their average software load, and an estimate of the number of the sold software units, which
is based on information concerning the market revenues of software vendors and software pricing. Cf.
ibid., p. 14.
6  In one of such surveys, the BSA has investigated the attitudes of the online consumers from six
different countries towards spam, i.e. commercial emails that they have received without requesting or
signing up for them (BSA, Consumer Attitudes Toward Spam in Six Countries, 2004, available at
http://www.bsa.org/usa/events/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=20654,
accessed on October 29, 2006). In each country, more than 80% of the respondents stated that they had
received spam which was concerned with computer software (ibid., p. 6), and 27% reported that, in the
product category “computer software”, they had “purchased an item or taken advantage of an offer”
which was suggested to them in spam (ibid., p. 13). Only 31% of the respondents stated that they
agreed with the statement that they would “never buy commercial software using this method because
it is most likely unlicensed and illegal” (ibid., p. 16).
3distribution of information goods in an enciphered format) and watermarking (i.e.
embedding information into a digital product in such a way that each copy of the good
becomes different).7 Watermarks can be used for tracking down the person who has
originally bought the legitimate copy of an information good from which the pirate
copies on the market have been produced, which makes it easier penalize commercial
pirates.8 Clearly, unlike the “advertising costs” of the pirates that were mentioned
above, the costs caused by DRM systems constitute fixed costs of production for
commercial pirates.
  Below I shall put forward a model of commercial piracy, i.e. of the trade of pirate
copies at a positive price. I shall refer to the agents who produce pirate copies for sale
as bootleggers. The model allows one to analyze the effects of DRM systems and the
policy instruments of the government on the profits of the bootleggers and the
copyright owner. In the model the “advertising costs” which are caused by an
increased risk of legal sanctions keep the price of pirate copies positive also when
there are several bootleggers on the market. Accordingly, the model differs from
previous work in the same field in so far that it provides tools for analyzing also the
market structure of the market for pirate copies and its effects on the market for
legitimate copies.9
  A welfare analysis of the model is somewhat problematic, given that it is concerned
with an illegal business model. Such an analysis would yield an answer to the
question which choice of the policy instruments by the government is optimal in the
sense of maximizing the value of a welfare function. However, illegal activities are
not normally included in the measured GDP even if they are known,10 and it is
questionable whether one should include the welfare which is obtained by illegal
7  For a survey, see Eskicioglu and Delp (2001).
8  Since a large-scale commercial pirate can be expected to be able to break down a cryptographic
system, watermarking seems to be the more relevant DRM tool in the context of large-scale
commercial piracy (cf. ibid., pp. 683-684). See also Park and Scotchmer (2005), contains an analysis of
DRM and of the different effects of the use of shared and independent DRM systems on end-user
piracy.
9   Cf. (Banerjee, 2003, 2006a, 2006b), which discuss models of the competition between the copyright
owner and a single pirate. In them the pirate copies are of a lower quality than legitimately bought
copies, and this stops the price of the good from sinking to zero through Bertrand competition.
However, in these models the number of the pirates is by assumption 1, and they do not address the
question why the price of the pirate copies does not sink to zero through a Bertrand competition
between the pirates (rather than between them and the copyright owner).
10  Cf. Myles (1995, pp. 383-5).
4means (like the profits from selling pirate copies, or the utility from using them) in
the welfare function of a social planner.11
  Below I shall not present a systematic welfare analysis of the current model. Rather,
I shall rest content with addressing the question how the choice of the fixed and
variable costs of bootlegging affects the profits of the bootleggers and the copyright
owner. It turns out that, whereas it is always in the interest in the copyright owner that
the fixed costs of the bootleggers are increased, an increase in the variable costs of the
bootleggers might also decrease the profits of the copyright owner. As the current
model contains just a single information good without any network effects, this result
is distinct from the familiar results that the producer of an information good might
profit from piracy if this makes it easier to sell complementary goods or services to
consumers,12 or if this leads network effects which increase its popularity.13
2. The Main Features of the Model
  The agents of the model that will be considered below are 1) a monopolist who sells
copies of an information product legally, 2) k bootleggers who sell illegitimate pirate
copies of the same good, and 3) a unit mass of consumers, which is indexed by
? ?0,1? ? . The bootleggers can inform the consumers of the availability of their
products by sending them advertisements at random. As a paradigmatic example of a
situation of this type, one might think of an illegally operating Internet site which
sends advertisements of pirated software products to randomly chosen e-mail
addresses. The sending of an advertisement is associated with a cost b which should
be interpreted as the increase in expected cost of punishment that sending a single
advertisement causes.
11  Cf. Sandmo (1981), in which the analogous problem is considered in the context of tax evasion. It is
problematic whether a welfare function of a model of tax evasion should include the utility of tax-
evaders since one might argue that the Pareto principle should not be extended to cases in which the
utility of an individual is increased by illegal means (ibid., p. 275).
12  For example, the demand for concerts by an artist might be increased by the pirate copies of her
recordings (Gayer and Shy, 2006). Somewhat less obviously, when the consumers do not know in
advance which information products they prefer (e.g. which musical recordings they would enjoy
listening), the possibility to sample pirate copies might make them willing to pay more for their
preferred product. Cf. Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006b.
13 See e.g. Conner and Rumelt (1991, Proposition 4 on p. 133).
5  More precisely, I shall assume that sending an advertisement causes an increase ?
in the risk of getting caught, that the bootlegger receives a punishment G if she gets
caught, and that the bootleggers are risk neutral. In this case the advertising cost b is
given by14
(1) b G??
It is easy to see that the problem of choosing ? and G so that the costs of the
government are minimized, given the constraint (1), does not have a well-defined
solution: if an increase in monitoring causes costs for the monitoring authorities, but
an increase in punishments (like fines) does not, any increase of G and decrease in ?
which keeps (1) valid seems always beneficial from the perspective of the
government.15 Hence, it seems that a meaningful discussion of the optimal choice of
?  and G would require a more general model, in which the welfare function of the
social planner depends also on other considerations besides the utility that consumers
receive from using information goods, the revenue of the monopolist, the revenue of
the bootleggers, and the monitoring costs of the government. Below I shall not discuss
the problem of choosing the optimal ?  and G for a given b, but I shall just analyze
the effects of the choice of b on the markets for legitimate and pirate copies.
  I shall assume that the bootleggers cannot keep track of the consumers to whom they
have already sent an advertisement. Rather, each of the bootleggers sends each of the
advertisements with the same probability to each consumer. This implies that a
bootlegger might send to the same consumer several advertisements in which the
product is offered for sale at different prices. This assumption is particularly plausible
in the context of trade on the Internet, since the potential customers of bootleggers
might have several e-mail addresses. In addition, if the consumers are divided into
groups whose members inform each other of the advertisements that they have
14  For a discussion of the econometric problem of actually constructing an index which measures the
strength of legal software protection in a given country, see Andrés (2006, pp. 34-37).
15 In note 11 above it was pointed out that the problems in choosing an appropriate welfare function
for an illegal business model have an obvious analogy in the context of the models of tax evasion. The
same applies to the problem of choosing ?  and G optimally. If the tax collector observes tax evasion
with a probability p and taxes unreported income with a penalty tax rate ? , a lowering of p will lower
the monitoring costs of the tax collector, so that any combination of a decrease of p and an increase of
?  which keeps the tax yield constant seems to be in the interest of the tax collector. Accordingly, the
most cost-efficient way to pursue tax evaders seems to be to “hang tax evaders with probability zero”
(Kolm, 1973, p. 266).  A standard answer to this implausible conclusion is that the aim of a tax
collector is not just to maximize tax revenue. One possibility is to view the tax collector as aiming at
maximizing the utility that the representative consumer receives from public goods and from their net
income, but this leaves out the relevant ethical considerations (ibid., pp. 267-270).
6received, a single advertisement might reach individuals with different e-mail
addresses, and in this case a bootlegger cannot eliminate the possibility that the same
group of consumers receives many advertisements from her. In this case one should
interpret b as the average cost of reaching a single consumer with a single
advertisement.
  This means that the description of the competition between the bootleggers
resembles the classical model of advertising by Gerard R. Butters which was put
forward in Butters (1977).  However, the current model differs from Butters’s model
in several essential respects. As it was already seen, the current is a model of an
oligopoly of k bootleggers, where 1k ? ,16 and since the advertising costs have been
meant to represent the expected costs from a punishment for copyright violation, it
will be for simplicity assumed that the monopolist may advertise for free, and that all
consumers have the option of buying the product from her. In addition, since I wish to
model a situation in which only a part of the consumers prefer buying a pirate copy to
buying a legitimate copy, unlike Butters I shall assume that the reservation prices of
the consumers differ.
  I shall assume that reservation price of the consumer ?  (where 0 1?? ? ) for a
legitimate copy of the good is ?  and that for a pirate copy her reservation price is q? ,
where ? ?0,1q?  is a constant. In Banerjee (2003), from which I have borrowed this
notation, it was assumed that q corresponds to the probability with which a pirate
copy is operational.17 However, here the parameter q has been meant to represent not
only the fact that a pirated product might be technically of a worse quality than a legal
one or not operational at all, but also features like that the consumers might prefer
legally bought copies also for ethical reasons, because there might be legal sanctions
against using (and not just against selling) pirate copies, or because buying a pirate
copy requires giving credit card information to criminals.
  Different values of q seem plausible in the different applications of the model. One
might expect that e.g. music files downloaded from a peer-to-peer network are
experienced by their users to be of an almost identical quality with legally bought
ones, and in this case it seems plausible to assume that 1q ? . However, the other
16  More precisely, Butters (1977) is for the most part concerned with a model with a large number of
sellers with no market power. See, however, Appendix A (ibid., pp. 483- 488) for a short discussion of
an oligopoly of N sellers.
17  Banerjee (2003, p. 100).
7considerations besides the technical quality seem more relevant in the case of e.g.
illegally bought software products, and this motivates the assumption that they
correspond to essentially lower values of q. Finally, if one applied the current model
to pirate copies of other branded articles instead of information goods, they could be
associated with even lower values of q.
  Given that the pricing of the monopolist is by assumption known to all consumers,
whereas the bootleggers try to avoid being detected by the authorities, it is natural to
assume that the bootleggers can react to the price chosen by the monopolist, but not
vice versa. Accordingly, I shall below consider a leader-follower game in which the
monopolist first sets the price Mp  of legitimate copies, and the bootleggers choose the
prices in their advertisements only after Mp   has become known.
18 It is clear that for
the monopolist the considered game is preferable to a Bertrand game in which the
price Mp  and the prices of the pirate copies are chosen simultaneously.
19
  More precisely, in the model the agents play the following three-stage game:
1)  The monopolist chooses the price Mp  of a legally bought copy of the good.
2)  The bootleggers decide the number of the advertisements that they send and their
price distribution and send them to randomly chosen consumers. The bootleggers are
not constrained to offering the product at the same price in different advertisements.
3) The consumers choose whether to buy the product. If a consumer ?  has not
received any advertisements, she will buy the product from the monopolist if
0Mp? ? ? , and she will buy nothing otherwise. If a consumer ?  has received at least
one advertisement, and if the lowest price suggested in the advertisements that she has
received is p, she will buy the product from the monopolist if
? ?max 0,Mp q p? ?? ? ? . If this is not the case, she will buy the product from a
bootlegger at price p if 0q p? ? ? . If neither of these conditions is valid, she will not
buy anything. If the consumer buys the product from a bootlegger at price p and if
18  Cf. ibid., which discusses both a leader-follower game and a Bertrand game in the context of a
model with a single pirate.
19  This is obvious, because in the equilibriums of both games the bootleggers choose the price
distribution which is optimal relative to the actual Mp , and in the leader-follower game the monopolist
chooses the value of Mp  for which this procedure leads to the largest revenue for her. Cf. also
Proposition 3 in ibid., p. 106.
8there are several bootleggers who have offered the product at price p to her, she will
choose one of them at random.
  In this game the aim of the monopolist is to maximize her profit, which is simply
equal to her revenue
(2) ? ? ? ?M M M M MR p p D p?
where ? ?M MD p  is the demand function of the monopolist. Each bootlegger
? ?1, 2,...,i k?  aims at maximizing the profit i i iP R bA? ? , where iR  is the revenue of
the ith bootlegger and iA  is the number of the advertisements that she sends.
  As it was explained in the introduction, we wish to allow for the possibility that, in
addition to the advertising cost b, the bootleggers might have also “fixed costs of
production” because of DRM systems or because the risk of receiving a punishment is
partially independent of the number of the sent advertisements.  This idea can easily
be incorporated into the current model by assuming that the number of the bootleggers
k is endogenously determined by a fixed cost F. More precisely, it can be assumed
that there will be new bootleggers who enter the market until market entry becomes
unprofitable, i.e. that
(3) ? ?max  when the number of the bootleggers isi ik k R bA F k? ?? ? ? ,
I shall below view b and k, rather than b and F as the policy variables whose values
are chosen by the government, since the government can affect the number of the
bootleggers k by changing the two kinds of costs b and F. I shall briefly return to a
discussion of the connections between k and the two kinds of costs at the end of
Section 4.
  Part 3) of the above definition implies that if the cheapest price at which a consumer
?  can buy the considered good from a bootlegger is p, she will buy it from the
monopolist if and only if
(4)
1
Mp p
q
? ??
?
 and Mp? ?
In this case the consumer will buy the product from the bootlegger if and only if
(5)
1
Mp p
q
? ??
?
 and q p? ? .
Clearly, (4) implies that if it were the case that
91
Mp p p
q q
? ?
?
there would be no consumers who would buy the product at price p. Hence, in
equilibrium all prices suggested in the advertisements must satisfy the condition
1
Mp p p
q q
? ?
?
which is equivalent with
(6) Mqp p? .
   If the condition (6) is valid for the cheapest price p which is suggested in the
advertisements that the consumer ?  has received, then it will be the case that:
If p q? ? , the consumer does not buy anything.
(7) If ? ? ? ?1Mp q p p q?? ? ? ? , the consumer buys a pirate copy for price p.
If ? ? ? ?1Mp p q? ? ? ? , the consumer buys a legitimate copy.
  I shall denote the demand function of the pirate copies by ? ?x p . More precisely, I
shall let ? ?x p  denote the proportion of the consumers who would buy a pirate copy at
the price p if p was the cheapest price which is suggested to them in the
advertisements that they have received.  This definition implies that ? ?x p  does not
depend on the prices that are suggested in the other advertisements although it does,
of course, depend on the price of the legitimate copies Mp .  Clearly, (7) implies that
(8) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?min 1 ,1Mx p p p q p q? ? ? ?
Here the case in which ? ? ? ?1 1Mp p q? ? ?  represents the situation in which there are
no consumers who would buy a legitimate copy if they are offered a pirate copy at
price p. Since the condition ? ? ? ?1 1Mp p q? ? ?  is equivalent with 1Mp p q? ? ? ,
(9) ? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
,                       1,    1
,    1 1 ,    1
MA M
B M M M
q p q p q px p p q p
x p
x p p q p qp p q q p q p
? ? ? ??? ? ??? ?? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
However, in Section 4 below it will be seen that in equilibrium the choice of Mp  by
the monopolist and the choices of the values of p by the bootleggers will be such that
? ? ? ?Bx p x p?  for all the advertisements that the bootleggers send.
10
  In the next section I deduce the equilibrium distribution of the prices of pirate copies
for a given value of Mp . This will be utilized in the subsequent discussion of the
optimizing problem of the monopolist who chooses Mp .  However, as it was
explained in the Introduction, reliable estimates of the size of the market for pirate
copies and of the risk of getting caught which bootleggers face are not available, and
accordingly it is also of some interest to study also the situation in which Mp  has not
been determined with an optimization procedure, but is exogenously given. This
situation can be thought of as a model of a case in which the copyright owner has no
information concerning the bootleggers, or bases her decisions on incorrect estimates
of the parameters that characterize the market for pirate copies.
3. The Market for Pirate Copies
Analogously with notation used in Butters (1977),20 I define ? ?iA p  to be the measure
of the advertisements sent by advertiser i at a price smaller than or equal with p, and
the function ? ?A p  by
(10) ? ? ? ?1
k
ii
A p A p
?
??
Further, I define ? ?ia p  and ? ?a p  to be the derivatives of ? ?iA p  and ? ?iA p ,
whenever these derivatives exist.
  If there were altogether A advertisements per consumer and the set of the consumers
was a finite set of size N, the probability with which a given consumer would receive
an advertisements would equal
11 1
AN
N
? ?? ?? ?
? ?
In the limit in which N ?? , this probability approaches the limit
11 lim 1 1
AN
A
NQ eN
?
??
? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
Since in the currently considered case the set of all consumers has by assumption the
measure 1, this expresses also measure of the consumers who receive an
20  Cf. Butters (1977, p. 469).
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advertisement when there are A advertisements per consumer.  In particular, the
probability with which a given consumer receives at least one advertisement from
advertiser i with a price not larger than p is
? ? ? ?1 iA piQ p e?? ?
  Suppose next that 1k ? , i.e. that there is just one bootlegger, and that the single
bootlegger sends j?  advertisements per consumer at the prices jp  ( 1, 2,...,j J? ),
where 1 2 ... Jp p p? ? ? . In this case the probability with which a given consumer has
not received an offer which is cheaper than jp  is ? ?11exp j jj ?? ????? , and the probability
with which she receives an offer with the price jp  is ? ?1 exp j?? ? , so that the profit
of the bootlegger is given by
? ? ? ?
1
1
1,
1 1
1
j
j
j j
J J
j j j
j j
P p x p e e b A
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
? ?
? ??? ?? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
Now it can be concluded, by considering each term of the sum separately, that for any
given values 1 2, ,..., J? ? ? , it is optimal for the single bootlegger to choose each of the
values jp   to be  price which maximizes ? ?px p . Since the profits that result when the
distribution function 1A  is continuous can be approximated with the profits that result
when 1A  is a step function with a finite number of prices, the conclusion is valid also
when 1A  is continuous. Hence, if 1k ? , it is optimal for the bootlegger to specify in
all of her advertisements the price which maximizes ? ?px p .  For reasons which will
become soon obvious, I shall denote this price by maxp  in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that there is just one bootlegger on the market. The single
bootlegger specifies the same price maxp  in all her advertisements, and the number of
the advertisements that she sends is given by
(11) ? ?maxlnA r b? .
where ? ?max max maxr p x p? .
12
The claim concerning the value of A follows from the fact that the profit of the single
bootlegger equals ? ?? ?1 max max 1 AP p x p e bA?? ? ? . Intuitively, maxr  is the expected
revenue that the bootlegger would receive from a single advertisement with the price
maxp  if there were no other advertisements on the market.
  Turning to the task of solving maxp  explicitly, it is first observed that (9) implies that
? ?Apx p  obtain its largest value when 2Ap p q? ? , and that ? ?Bpx p  obtain its
largest value when 2B Mp p qp? ? . Clearly, A Bp p? .  It is easy to see with
elementary methods that if 1A B Mp p p q? ? ? ? , the optimal price is Bp  and that if
1M A Bp q p p? ? ? ? , the optimal price is Ap . It is also clear if neither of these
conditions is valid, it must be the case that 1A M Bp p q p? ? ? ? , and in this case the
optimal price must be the corner solution 1Mp p q? ? ? .  In other words,
? ? ? ?
? ?max
2,       2 1
1,     2 1 2
2,                1 2
M M M
M M M
M
qp qp p q
p p q q p q qp
q p q q
? ? ??
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ? ??
This can be equivalently expressed as
(12)
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?max
2,      2 1 2
1,   2 1 2 1 2
2,           1 2
M M
M M
M
qp p q q
p p q q q p q
q p q
? ? ? ?
??? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ???
Hence,
(13) ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?max
2 1 ,      2 1 2
1 ,   2 1 2 1 2
1 2,               1 2
M M
M M
M
p q p q q
x p p q q q p q
p q
? ? ? ? ?
??? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ???
  Together with Proposition 1, (12) and (13) imply that
(14)
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
2ln 4 1 ,                      2 1 2
ln 1 1 ,   2 1 2 1 2
ln 4 ,                                      1 2
M M
M M M
M
qp b q p q q
A p q p qb q q p q
q b p q
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?
?
? ???
  The following proposition describes a symmetric equilibrium with k bootleggers,
where 1k ? .
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PROPOSITION 2.  Suppose that Mp  has some fixed, given value, that the number of the
bootleggers k is larger than 1, and that there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the
market for pirate copies. The largest price suggested in the advertisements has still the
value maxp , and the smallest price minp  suggested in them is determined by the
condition
(15) 1 1 1min max
k kr b r??
where ? ?min min minr p x p?  and ? ?max max maxr p x p? . The amount of advertisements with
a price not larger than ? ?min max,p p p?  sent by a bootlegger i is given by
(16) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
min min min
1 1ln ln
1 1i
px p px p
A p
k p x p k r
? ?
? ?
The total number of advertisements sent by each bootlegger is given by
(17) max min1 ln lni
rA rA
k k b b
? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
and the revenue of each bootlegger equals
(18) ? ?min min1 iAiR r e r b?? ? ?
The profit of each bootlegger is
(19) minmin lni i i
rP R bA r b b
b
? ? ? ? ?
  Obviously, the quantity minr  which determines minp  in accordance with (15) is the
expected revenue that a single advertisement with the price minp  would yield if there
were no other advertisements.
  The expression of the revenue of the bootleggers, (18), has an obvious intuitive
interpretation: it is the revenue that bootlegger i would earn if she changed all the
prices in her advertisements to minp , the minimum price that occurs in them, provided
that the other bootleggers did not change their price distributions.
  Propositions 1 and 2 make it easy to study the effects of the policy variables – i.e.,
the advertising costs b which are caused by the monitoring by the government, and the
fixed costs which implicitly determine k via (3), and which might also be caused by
DRM systems rather than monitoring – on the market for pirate copies when the
monopolist does not optimize Mp .
14
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that Mp  is fixed.
(a) Both the total number of the advertisements that are sent by the bootleggers and
the largest price maxp suggested in their advertisements are independent of the number
of the bootleggers on the market. However, an increase in their number shifts the
price distribution of the advertisements downwards and decreases the profit of each
bootlegger.
(b) An increase in the advertising costs b reduces the number of the advertisements. If
there is just one bootlegger, her profit is a decreasing function of b, but the price of
the pirate copies is independent of b. When there are at least two bootleggers, an
increase of b shifts the price distribution of the pirate copies upwards. In this case the
profit iP  of each bootlegger receives its maximum value for single value Eb  of b
within the interval ? ?max0,b r? . The profit iP  is an increasing function of b when
Eb b?  and a decreasing function of b when Eb b? , and
max0
lim lim 0b i b r iP P? ?? ? .
  The part (b) of this result is concerned with the question how the profits of each
bootlegger depend on the parameter b. This question is important for obvious reasons:
when the number of the bootleggers on the market depends on their profits in
accordance with (3), it is in the interest of the monopolist that their profits are low.  It
is clear that sending advertisements cannot be profitable if the cost parameter b is
larger than the value maxr , i.e. the revenue from a single advertisement which is sent at
the optimal price when there are no other advertisements on the market. On the other
hand, Proposition 3 (b) states that when 0b ? ?  and 2k ? , the revenue and the profit
earned from the advertisements approaches zero because of the increased competition
in the pirate copy market, although the number of the advertisements approaches
infinity according to  Proposition 2. A situation of this kind might arise when the
bootleggers do not have fixed costs, and it can viewed as the analogy of a peer-to-peer
network in the context of the current model.
  Figure 1 shows the profit of a bootlegger as a function of b, and it also illustrates an
important implication of this proposition: it suggests that it is not necessarily in the
interest of the monopolist that b is increased, because an increase in b might raise the
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profits from bootlegging and give potential bootleggers an incentive to enter the
market by paying the fixed cost F.  However, a rigorous demonstration of the fact that
a case of this kind is possible must be postponed after the discussion of the
optimization problem of the monopolist.
Figure 1.
4. The market for legitimate copies
   In the current model the profit of the monopolist is equal with her revenue
? ? ? ?M M M M MR p p D p? . The characterization of the demand ? ?M MD p  of the
monopolist is easy when ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . In this case maxp  is according to
(12) such that none of the consumers who have the option of buying a pirate copy will
choose a legitimate copy, and the demand of the monopolist is simply
? ? ? ?1AM M MD p e p?? ?
Here the total number of the advertisements A is according to Propositions 1 and 2
given by
Pi
bbE rmax
F
16
? ? ? ?? ?? ?max max maxln lnA r b p x p b? ?
so that one can conclude from (12) and (13) that
(20) ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
1 ,     2 1 2 1 2
4 1 ,        1 2
M M
M M
M M
qb p q q q p q
D p
b p q p q
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ?
? ? ???
 It is essentially more difficult to calculate ? ?M MD p  in the more interesting case in
which ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , however. In the following lemma ? ?M MD p has been
calculated by dividing the set of the potential customers – i.e., the consumers for
whom Mp? ?  – into three subsets, one of which might be empty. By the low-
valuation consumers, I mean the potential customers who would not have bought a
legitimate copy, if they had been offered a pirate copy for the price maxp . Clearly, this
is true of a consumer ?  if and only if ? ? ? ?max 1Mp p q? ? ? ? . The high-valuation
consumers (if any) are the potential customers who would have bought a legitimate
copy even if they had been offered a pirate copy for the price minp . Clearly, this is true
of a consumer ?  if and only if ? ? ? ?min 1Mp p q? ? ? ? . Finally, the rest of the
potential customers (if any) will be called medium valuation consumers.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , and put
? ?min minmax , 1Mp p p q? ? ? ? .
Now the demand of the monopolist is given by
(21) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?M M H M Med M L MD p D p D p D p? ? ?
where
(22) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?min min1 1 max 0,1 1H M M MD p p p q p p q?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
is the demand from the high-valuation consumers,
(23) ? ? ? ?max 1
min
1
1
p kA p
Med M p
D p e dp
q
?
?
?
? ?
is the demand from the medium-valuation consumers, and
(24) ? ? 2L M
M
bD p
p
?
is the demand from the low-valuation consumers.
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  Intuitively, minp?  is the lowest price p which occurs in the advertisements and which
is such that some consumers prefer buying a legitimate copy to buying a pirate copy
for the price p.  This means that when min minp p? ? , some advertisements are such that
none of the consumers who receive them will buy a legitimate copy.  It should be
observed that this lemma is formally valid also when 1k ? , but in this case
min min maxp p p? ? ?  so that ? ? 0Med MD p ? .
  Unfortunately, it seems that one cannot express the value of the integral which
occurs in (23) in terms of elementary functions. The results in the rest of this section
are based on a change of variables in this integral. Clearly, using (16) ? ?Med MD p  can
be expressed in the form
(25) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
max max1
min min
1
min min1 1
1 1
k k
p pkA p
Med M p p
p x p
D p e dp dp
q q px p
?
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
and (15), (12), and (13) together imply that
(26) ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?1 12
1 1 1
min min max max 4 1
k
k k k Mqpp x p b p x p b
q
?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ??? ?
If one now puts
(27) ? ?Mz p qp?
it follows from (9) that
(28) ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
1 12
1 1
1
1 1
k k k k
k k k kM Mp qp p qppx p z z
q q q
? ?
? ?? ?? ? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
Together (26) and (28) imply that
(29)
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
1
min min
21 1 12
1 1 1
4 1
k k
k k k
MM
p x p b q q f z
px p qpqp z z
?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
where
(30) ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?11 14 1 k kk
bf z
z z
??
?
?
Since ? ?Mdz dp qp? , (25) now implies that
(31) ? ? ? ?
min
1 21
M
Med M p qp
M
D p f z dz
p ?
? ?
In addition , (29) immediately implies that
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(32)
2
min
1
M
M
p qpf
qp q
? ?
?? ? ?? ?
  These results make it easy to analyze the comparative statics of the profit of the
monopolist relative to the policy variables b and k, when the price set by the
monopolist is fixed. This analysis produces unsurprising results.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose Mp  is fixed. For a fixed number of bootleggers, the profit of
the monopolist is an increasing function of b. When ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , the
profit of the monopolist is independent of the market structure in the market for pirate
copies, but when ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , the profit of the monopolist is a decreasing
function of the number of the bootleggers.
Although it seems that the profit of the monopolist ? ?M MR p cannot be expressed in
terms of elementary functions, the result (31) nevertheless allows one to give an
relatively elegant characterization for its derivative. This is presented in the next
proposition.
PROPOSITION 5. The optimal price Mp  of legitimate copies is never such that some
pirate copies would be so cheap that there would be no consumers who prefer buying
a legitimate copy to buying one of them. If Mp  is such that this is not the case, and if
there are pirate copies on the market,
(33) ? ? min2 21
1 1
M M M
M
dR p p p
dp q q
? ? ?
? ?
.
  Since according to this proposition min 1Mp p q? ? ?  in equilibrium, (9) implies that
in equilibrium all pirate copies have a price for which ? ? ? ?Bx p x p? .
PROPOSITION 6. The monopolist will choose a price for which pirate copies do not
become available ? ? ? ?? ?21 4 2b q q q? ? ? . If this condition is valid, the price chosen
by the monopolist is given by
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(34)
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
2 2
22
4 1 ,                1 4 2 1 2
min 1 2,  1 2 4 ,    1 2
M
q b q q q q b q q q
p
q q bq b q q q
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ?
? ? ? ? ? ??
?
If ? ? ? ?? ?21 4 2b q q q? ? ? , pirate copies become available. In this case the
equilibrium value of Mp  is uniquely determined by the condition
(35) min2 21 0
1 1
Mp p
q q
? ? ?
? ?
Figure 2.
Proposition 6 makes it to possible to give a simple qualitative characterization of
? ?M MR p . The formula ? ? ? ?1M M M MR p p p? ?  expresses the profit of a monopolist
who does not compete with bootleggers. This formula corresponds to the parabola
which has been drawn in Figure 2, and it is valid as long as the price Mp  remains
below the threshold ,0Mp  at which the pirate copy market emerges.  Obviously, this
threshold is determined by the condition
? ?,0 ,0M Mb p x p?
RM
pMp´ pM,BpM,A
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  The figure shows also the profit of the monopolist as a function of Mp   for two
values of b, which correspond to the threshold values ,M Ap    and ,M Bp . Proposition 6
easily implies that the monopolist raises the price Mp  above ,0Mp  if ,0Mp p?? , where
? ? ? ?1 2p q q? ? ? ?
The curve which begins at ,M M Ap p?  illustrates this case in the figure. On the other
hand, the derivative ? ?M M MdR p dp  is negative when ,0M Mp p?  if ,0Mp p?? . The
curve which begins at ,M M Bp p?  corresponds to a case of this kind, and in this case it
is optimal for the monopolist to choose ,0M Mp p?  so that the market for pirate copies
does not emerge.
  It is, of course, a trivial consequence of Proposition 4 that also when the monopolist
chooses Mp  optimally, the profit of the monopolist increases if b increases, and if k
decreases and ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . These results are based on the assumption that
the two the policy variables, the advertising costs b and the number of the bootleggers
k, are independent of each other. However, as we have already suggested, this is not
necessarily the case: if the bootleggers have other costs beside the advertising costs,
an increase in b might increase the number of the active bootleggers, indirectly
decreasing the profits of the monopolist. I shall conclude this section by
demonstrating that a case of this kind is, indeed, possible. For this reason, I consider
the following game between the monopolist and a large number of potential
bootleggers.
1) The monopolist sets the price Mp  of legitimate copies.
2) Each potential bootlegger decides whether to enter the market and to pay a
fixed cost F.
3) The bootleggers who have entered send their advertisements, just like in step
2) of the game that was defined in Section 2.
4) The consumers make their buying decisions, just like in step 3) of the game
that was defined in Section 2.
Clearly, if the number of the potential bootleggers is sufficiently large, in equilibrium
the number of the bootleggers who enter the market must satisfy (3).
PROPOSITION 7. Consider the game with a fixed cost F which was defined above.
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1) An increase in F has always a non-negative effect on the equilibrium profit of the
monopolist.
2) An increase of b will in some cases increase and in some cases decrease the profit
of the monopolist.
5. Concluding Remarks
 Above I discussed commercial piracy and the significance of government policy in
preventing it. I started by observing that it seems at first glance puzzling that
commercial piracy can be profitable, and that the prices of pirate copies of
information goods do not always decrease to zero through Bertrand competition.
Above this puzzle was answered by drawing a distinction between the different
effects that the monitoring by the government has on the illegal business model of a
bootlegger, i.e. of a commercial pirate: the expected cost of a punishment can partially
be viewed as a fixed cost of production of the pirate, and partially as an advertising
cost which depends on the number of the consumers to whom the bootlegger offers
her products. The fact that commercial piracy can be profitable was explained by
assuming that the fixed costs restrict the entry to the market for pirate copies, and that
the advertising costs keep the prices of pirate copies above their production costs.
  In the model the advertising costs and the number of the commercial pirates were
policy variables which represented the extent to which and the ways in which the
government fights piracy. However, I did not present a detailed welfare analysis from
which one could have deduced the optimal values of these policy variables. As it was
pointed out above, a welfare analysis of an illegal business model is somewhat
problematic, since it is not clear whether a social planner should aim at maximizing
welfare which is obtained by illegal means. It is easy to see that a welfare analysis
would have yielded the result that consumer welfare is always increased by a decrease
in the costs of the pirates. However, the effects of the policy variables on the profits of
the bootleggers and the copyright owner are more difficult to analyze.
  Comparative static analysis reveled that the effects of the two policy variables on the
profits of the copyright owner and the commercial pirates were different: whereas it
was always in the interest of the monopolist that the fixed costs were increased, this
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was not true of the advertising costs, because without them pirate copies do not have a
positive price. Hence, an increase in the advertising costs might increase the incentive
to enter the market for pirate copies.  Since fixed costs of production could also be
caused by technical protection devices of information goods, whereas – at least in the
case of the commercial piracy on the Internet – the “advertising costs” result almost
completely from the increased risk of a punishment, one way to interpret the above
results would be that if an information good is distributed in a form which makes it
difficult to copy, e.g. if it is protected by a DRM system, an improvement of the
technical protection is always in the interest of the copyright owner, but this is not
necessarily true of an increase in the legal protection of information goods.
  On the other hand, when there are no fixed costs, an increase of the advertising costs
is always in the interest of the monopolist. As it was pointed out above, a peer-to-peer
network can be viewed as the limiting case of the current model in which the both the
advertising costs and the fixed costs have sunk to zero, and since a peer-to-peer
network makes pirate copies easily available to anyone for free, in the current model it
corresponds to the minimum of the profit of the copyright owner.
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APPENDIX. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.
Below the smallest price which is suggested in the advertisements will be denoted by
minp  and the largest one will be denoted by maxp? . Using these notations, the revenue
of each bootlegger i can be expressed as
(A1) ? ? ? ? ? ?max
min 1
exp
Kp
i k ip
k
R px p A p a p dp
?
?
? ?? ?? ?
? ?
??
Next we shall show that maxp?  has the value maxp , i.e. the price which would be
optimal if there was only a single bootlegger on the market. It is clear that maxp?
cannot be larger than maxp , since the quantity ? ?px p  obtains is largest value when
maxp p? , so that when maxp p? ,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?max max max
1 1
exp exp
K K
k k
k k
px p A p p x p A p
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
and if a bootlegger advertised at a price larger than maxp , she could increase the value
of the integral in (A1) by replacing all the prices which are above maxp  by the price
maxp .
  Next we observe that in equilibrium there cannot be an interval
? ? ? ?min max, ,p p p p? ?? ?  of a positive length which is such that no bootleggers
advertised at any of the prices belonging to ? ?,p p? ?? . This can be shown by supposing,
on the contrary, that ? ?,p p? ??  is an interval with this property, and by letting ? ?,p p??? ????
be the largest interval which contains ? ?,p p? ??  and which has this property. Now the
function
? ?
1
exp
K
k
k
A p
?
? ??? ?
? ?
?
is a constant within the interval ? ?,p p??? ???? , and for sufficiently small values of ?  it
will be the case that each bootlegger i can increase her profits by replacing in her
advertisements all the prices which belong to ? ?,p p???? ????  by the price p???? . Hence,
the considered situation cannot be an equilibrium.
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  It can now be concluded that the problem of maximizing the integral in (A1) cannot
have a corner solution in which the value of the function ia  is zero in a part of the
interval ? ? ? ?min max min max, ,p p p p? ? . Since this corner solution has now been ruled out,
the problem of maximizing this integral can be solved with the standard tools of the
calculus of variations.
  When one puts
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?, , exp iAi i j i
j i
f A a p px p A p e a p?
?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
?
the Euler equation which must be valid in the interval ? ?min max,p p  for a function
? ?iA p  for which the function iR  given by (A1) obtains its maximum value turns out
to be
(A2) 0
i i
f d f
A dp a
? ?? ?
? ?
  This Euler equation is equivalent with
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?exp exp 0i iA Aj i j
j i j i
dpx p A p e a p px p A p e
dp
? ?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
with
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1 1
exp 0
k k
i j j
j j
dpx p a p px p px p a p A p
dp ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
and with
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?j
j i
x p px p px p a p
?
?? ? ?
It can now be concluded that if the bootlegger i has chosen the price distribution
optimally, then it must be the case that for all ? ?min max,p p p?
(A3) ? ? ? ?? ?
1
j
j i
x p
a p
p x p?
?
? ??
  Since we are considering a symmetric equilibrium, it can be concluded from (A3)
that
? ? ? ?? ?
1 1
1i
x p
a p
k p x p
? ??
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?
so that
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? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?min min min
1 1 1 ln
1 1
p
i p
x u px p
A p du
k u x u k p x p
? ??
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
?
This proves the validity of (16).
  Now it can be concluded that the revenue of each bootlegger is given by
(A4)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
max
min
max
min
min min
min min
exp
   1
i
i
i
p A p
i j ip
j i
p A p
ip
A
R px p A p e a p dp
p x p
px p e a p dp
px p
p x p e
?
?
?
?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?
??
?
This proves the validity of (18).
  The profit of each bootlegger is given by
(A5) ? ?? ?min min 1 iAi i i iP R bA p x p e bA?? ? ? ? ?
This result establishes a connection between the values of iA  and minp   in
equilibrium, since iA  must have the value which maximizes profits for the given
value of minp . In other words, in equilibrium it must be the case that
? ?min min 0iAi
i
P p x p e b
A
?? ? ? ?
?
so that
(A6) ? ?min minlni
p x p
A
b
?
  On the other hand, the values of iA  and minp  are connected also by the fact that the
total number of the advertisements that the advertiser i sends is ? ?maxiA p . The result
(16), which has already been proved, implies that
(A7) ? ? ? ?? ?
max max
max
min min
1 ln
1i i
p x p
A A p
k p x p
? ?
?
Together the results (A6) and (A7) imply that
? ? ? ?
? ?
min min max max
min min
1ln ln
1
p x p p x p
b k p x p
?
?
and this is equivalent with
? ? ? ?? ?11 1min min max max kkp x p b p x p??
This proves the validity of (15). Plugging this result into (A6) one gets
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? ?? ? ? ?1max max max max
1
1ln ln
k
i k
p x p p x p
A
b k b
? ?
Together with (A6), this proves the validity of (17) and completes the proof. Now
(19) follows trivially from the results that have already been proved.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.
All the statements in this proposition follow trivially from Proposition 1 and 2, except
for the claim concerning the profit iP  in the case in which 2k ? . In order to
demonstrate it, we assume that 2k ?  and observe that in this case (19) implies that
(A8) ? ?
1
max max
1
1 11 1 1 ln
k
i
k
dP b rk
db b k b k
? ? ? ? ?
and that
(A9)
2 1
max
2 2 1 1
1 1ki
k
d P rk
db k b kb?
?
? ? ?
 This immediately implies that there is precisely one value of ? ?max0,b r?  for which
2 2 0iP b? ? ? , and this further implies that there are at most two values of ? ?max0,b r?
for which 0iP b? ? ? . It is now observed that (A8) implies that
(A10) ? ?
max
11 1 1 0i
b r
dP k
db k?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
Hence, there can be at most one value of b within the interval ? ?max0, r  for which
0iP b? ? ? . On the other hand, since the function iP  is by construction positive in the
interval ? ?max0, r , and since it has the limit 0 when 0b ?  and when maxb r? , it must
be the case that 0iP b? ? ?  for at least one value ? ?max0,b r? . Since it has now been
seen that there is precisely one value ? ?max0,Eb r?  with this property, it can be
concluded that iP  is an increasing function of b when Eb b?  and that iP  is a
decreasing function of b when .Eb b?
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PROOF OF LEMMA 1. When ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , (12) implies that max 2Mp qp? .
In this case an agent ? will be a high-valuation consumer if and only if
min
1
Mp p
q
? ??
?
so that  the demand from such consumers is 0 if ? ? ? ?min 1 1Mp p q? ? ? , and
? ? ? ?min1 1Mp p q? ? ?
otherwise. This proves (22).
  On the other hand, a consumer ?  is a low-valuation consumer if and only if
max
1
Mp p
q
? ??
?
A consumer ?  for whom this condition is valid will nevertheless buy a legitimate
copy if Mp? ?  and if she does not receive any advertisements, which is the case with
probability Ae? . Hence, the demand from such consumers is given by
(A11) ? ? max
1
AM
L M M
p pD p p e
q
?? ??? ?? ??? ?
Since (14) implies that ? ?? ?? ?2ln 4 1MA qp b q? ? , (A11) simplifies to the form
? ? 2L M
M
bD p
p
?
This proves (24). Finally, the demand from the medium-valuation consumers (if any)
is the demand from the consumers for whom
(A12) max min
1 1
M Mp p p p
q q
?? ?? ?
? ?
Clearly, a medium valuation consumer ?  will buy a legitimate copy if she has not
received an advertisement which would specify a price below ? ?p ? , where ? ?p ?  is
given by
? ?
1
Mp p
q
?
?
?
?
?
This is equivalent with
(A13) ? ? ? ?1Mp p q? ?? ? ?
The demand of the monopolist from the consumers for whom (A12) is valid is now
seen to be given by
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(A14) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?min 1
max
min 1 ,1
1
M
M
p p q kA p
Med M p p q
D p e d? ?
? ? ?
? ?
? ?
Putting ? ?min minmax , 1Mp p p q? ? ? ?  and replacing the variable ?  with the variable
? ?p ?  which is given by (A13), the formula (A14) is seen to be equivalent with
? ? ? ?max 1
min
1
1
p kA p
Med M p
D p e dp
q
?
?
?
? ?
The proves (23) and completes the proof of this lemma.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.
When ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , the claims of this proposition follow trivially from
(20) and the continuity of ? ?M MD p . When ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , according to
Lemma 1 and (31)
(A15) ? ? ? ?
min
1 2min 1 21
1 M
M
M M p qp
M M
p p bD p f z dz
q p p?
??? ? ? ?
? ? .
For the purposes of a comparative static analysis, ? ?f z will be viewed as given by the
formula (30) for arbitrary real values of k although, of course, (A15) has a meaningful
economic interpretation only when k is an integer. Clearly, (A15) is formally valid
also when 1k ? , since in this case ? ? ? ?min max 1 2M Mp qp p qp? ? ? , so that the
integral on the right-hand side of (A15) vanishes.
  The analysis of the partial derivatives of ? ?M MD p b? ?  and ? ?M MD p k? ?  is
complicated by the fact that the values of the parameters b and k implicitly affect minp?
when min minp p? ? .  However, (A15) and (32) imply that in this case
? ?
? ?
min
min
1 1 0
1
M M
M M M
D p pf
p q p qp qp
? ? ??
? ? ?? ??? ? ? ?
On the other hand, minp?  is independent of b and k when min 1Mp p q? ? ? ? , so that in
both cases
(A16) ? ? ? ?min min
min min
0M M M M
D p D pp p
b p k p
? ?? ?? ?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
Together with  (A15) and (30), this implies that
(A17) ? ? ? ?
min
1 21 2 0
M
M M
p qp
M M
D p f z
dz
b p b p?
? ?
? ? ?
? ??
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so that the demand of the monopolist is an increasing function of b. Similarly, since
? ?4 1 1z z? ?  when 1 2z ?   it must be the case that
(A17)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
min
min
1 2
1 1
1 2
1
1 1    0
1 4 1
M
M
M M
p qp
M
k
p qp
M
D p f z
dz
k p k
b dz
p z z k z z
?
?
?
? ?
?
? ?
? ??? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?
?
This completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. First it is observed that if ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ?  and there
are bootleggers who send advertisements, none of the consumers who receives one of
them will by a legitimate copy, and (20) immediately implies that
? ? ? ?M M M M MR p p D p?  is a decreasing function of Mp  and that the monopolist can
increase her profits by lowering the price Mp . Suppose now that
? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . In this case (15) is valid, so that the profit of the monopolist
is given by
(A18) ? ? ? ?
min
1 2
min1 2
1 M
M
M M M p qp
p pR p p f z dz b
q ?
?? ??
? ? ? ?? ??? ?
?
and its derivative is seen to be
(A19) ? ? ? ?minmin min1
1
M M MM
M
M M M M
dR p d p qpd p p pp f
dp dp q dp qp
?? ?? ? ? ?? ??
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ? ?? ?
If min 1Mp p q? ? ? ? , this implies that
? ? ? ? min1 1 0M M M
M M M
dR p q pd pf
dp dp q qp
? ?? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
and the monopolist has an incentive to lower the price. Hence, in equilibrium
min min 1Mp p p q? ? ? ? ? , and some consumers would buy a legitimate copy even if
they could get a pirate copy for minp .
Assume now that min minp p? ? . Now (A19) and (32) imply that
? ? 2min min min min
2
min min min
2 11
1 1 1
2 2 2   1 1
1 1 1 1
M M M M M
M M M M M
M M
dR p p p p dp dp p qp
dp q q dp qp dp qp q
p p p p p
q q q q
? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?
?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
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This completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.
Proposition 5 and (12) imply that the monopolist will not choose a price Mp  for
which ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ?  if  pirate copies become available with this choice of
Mp , because in this case none of the consumers who can buy a pirate copy would buy
a legitimate one. The largest value of b for which the bootleggers advertise if the
monopolist chooses ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ?  is the value b??  for which
? ?max maxb p x p?? ?  when ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . Clearly,
(A20) ? ?
? ?2
1
2
q q
b
q
?
?? ?
?
If b b??? , the monopolist choose a price for which the bootleggers do not advertise. If
the largest price Mp  for which this is the case is not larger than 1 2 , it is according to
(12) such that max 1Mp q p? ? ? , and it is determined by the condition
? ? ? ?? ?max max
1 1M Mq p pb p x p
q
? ? ?
? ?
In this case the equation ? ?max maxp x p b?  is valid if and only if
(A21) 21 2 4Mp q q bq? ? ? ?
This proves the latter part of formula (34).
   Suppose now that b b??? , and let ,0Mp  be the smallest value of Mp  for which the
bootleggers still advertise. Clearly, ? ? ? ?? ?,0 2 1 2Mp q q? ? ?  so that when ,0M Mp p? ,
it must be the case that max 2Mp qp?  and the condition ? ?max maxb p x p?  receives the
form
? ?
2
,0 ,0 ,0
2 2 4 1
M M Mqp qp qpb x
q
? ?
? ?? ? ?? ?
Hence,
(A22) ? ?,0
4 1
M
q b
p
q
?
?
When ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , solving minp  from (15), (12), and (13) yields
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? ? 1 1
min 2
4 1
1 1
2
k
M
M
q bqpp
qp
?? ??? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
This implies that min 1Mdp dp ? , so that one can conclude from (35) that
(A23) ? ?
2
min
2
2 2 0
1 1
M M
M M
d R p dp
dp q dp q
? ? ?
? ?
This shows that if the derivative ? ?M M MdR p dp  is negative when ,0M Mp p? , it is
negative for all values ,0M Mp p? . Hence, the monopolist has an incentive to raise the
price above ,0M Mp p?  if and only if
(A24)
? ?,0 0M M
M
dR p
dp
?
Since min max max 2p p qp? ?  when ,0M Mp p?  , Proposition 5 and (A22) imply that
? ? ? ?,0 ,0 ,02 21 1 4 1
1 1 1
M M M M
M
dR p p qp q bq
dp q q q q
?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
and this is positive if and only if
? ?
? ?2
1
4 2
q q
b
q
?
?
?
Together with (A22), this proves the former part of (34). Finally, the fact that the
condition (35) suffices to determine equilibrium value of Mp   when it is larger than
,0Mp  follows from Proposition 5 and (A23).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.
It is obvious that if F is increased and the monopolist does not change the value of
Mp , the value of k determined by (3) either decreases or stays the same. Hence,
Proposition 4 implies that the profit of the monopolist either increases or stays the
same when F increases. Trivially, this must remain valid also when the monopolist
chooses Mp  optimally.
  To prove the latter claim, let 0? ?  be arbitrary, assume that the fixed costs are given
by ? ?F ? ?? , and compare two possible values of the advertising costs, ? ? 21b ? ??
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and ? ?2b ? ?? . Clearly, if ? ?1b b ??  and at least two bootleggers pay the fixed cost
? ?F ? , their profit is at most
? ? ? ? ? ? 21 max 1 0b r b F? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
so that in this case there will be at most one bootlegger on the market, independently
of the choice of Mp . It is clear that in this case the monopolist will let one bootlegger
enter in equilibrium if ?  is sufficiently small. In this case the equilibrium price
chosen by the monopolist is given by ? ? ? ?, 1 1 2M bp q q? ? ? , and the equilibrium
profit of the monopolist satisfies the condition
(A25) ? ? ? ? ? ?0 , 1 , 1
2 1lim 1
2 1 2 2M b M b M M
q qR p p p
q q? ? ?
? ?? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
On the other hand, if ? ?2b b ? ?? ?  and there are at least two bootleggers on the
market, in the limit in which 0? ? ?  the profit of the monopolist approaches
? ? ? ?? ?0 , 2lim 1 1M b M M MR p p p q? ? ? ? ? ?
so that its maximum value approaches
(A26) ? ? ? ?0 , 2 , 2lim 1 4M b M bR p q? ? ? ? ?
When ? ?2b b ?? , there will less than two bootleggers on the market only if
? ? ? ? ? ?2 max 2 max 2 0b r b F r? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?
This is equivalent with max 2r ?? , and it is clear that if ?  is sufficiently small, it
cannot be in the interest of the monopolist to choose such a small value of Mp  that
this condition would be valid for maxr . Now it can be concluded from (A25) and (A26)
that for sufficiently small values of ?  an increase of b from ? ?1b b ??  and ? ?2b b ??
will decrease the equilibrium profit of the monopolist.
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